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Introduction
Critical infrastructures are organizations and institu-
tions whose failure or impairment would cause sus-
tained shortage of supplies, significant disruption of 
public security, or other dramatic consequences for 
the state or community they support.1 A similar defini-
tion is given by the US Department of Homeland Se-
curity: ‘Critical infrastructures are systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such sys-
tems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination of those matters.’2
Following the classification in the German National 
Strategy for Critical Infrastructure protection (CIP)3, 
critical infrastructures can be divided by their techni-
cal, structural, and functional characteristics into es-
sential technical basic infrastructures or essential so-
cial and economic service infrastructures. The 
technical basic infrastructures include power supply, 
information and communication technologies of 
transport, traffic as well as drinking water supply and 
sewage disposal. Health systems, food chains, emer-
gency and rescue services, civil protection, govern-
ment infrastructure (including the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches), financial services and 
media all belong to the socio-economic service infra-
structure. Space is not explicitly listed, although the 
basic technical infrastructure as well as the essential 
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Russia: 131
China: 142
Rest of the World: 483
Civil: 21
Commercial: 
250
Government: 
126
Military: 152
USA: 549
provide crucial information for today’s military opera-
tions. The resolution of optical and radar systems has 
greatly improved over recent decades. Command and 
Control (C2) of operational military forces by land, sea, 
and air would be inconceivable without military com-
munication satellites. The dual-use nature of military 
satellites has driven reliance by the civil sector. Global 
Positioning System (GPS) satellites, which were origi-
nally designed to enhance military navigational and 
targeting requirements, have driven multibillion dol-
lar civil industries. In addition, weather satellites, which 
were originally launched by the military, have been 
nearly replaced by the civilian sector.
A science adviser to US President Ronald Reagan stated 
in 1987 that ‘even in a very limited war, we would have 
an absolutely critical dependence on space today’.7 This 
prediction was clearly confirmed in more recent US 
and Alliance operations such as in the Persian Gulf re-
gion, Afghanistan, and Libya, where the military uses of 
space greatly enhanced the Alliance’s effectiveness. 
socio-economic service infrastructures depend on 
space or at least are irreversibly linked to space capa-
bilities.4 This is true for the military as well. Almost all of 
today’s military operations rely on capabilities ena-
bled by space-based systems. Consequently, space 
assets have become a critical infrastructure not only 
for the civilian sector but also for the military world, as 
demonstrated by the numbers depicted in Figure 1.
Military Dependency on the Critical 
Infrastructure Space
Space systems remain an integral part of national se-
curity. The importance of space capabilities rose dur-
ing the cold war, when the United States and the So-
viet Union strove to observe the other’s strategic 
weapon arsenal.6 From today’s point of view, this 
helped provide a stable nuclear deterrence strategy. 
Space-based surveillance and reconnaissance sys-
tems have developed further since the cold war and 
Figure 1: Space assets in use by the major world powers (includes launches through 31 August 2015).5
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gard to the technical operation of launcher systems. 
Both require respective defensive measures or safe-
guards that are not further addressed in this article. 
The further focus will be threats towards on-orbit 
space systems.
On orbit space systems are exposed to a number of 
highly probable risks, which, according to a study of the 
German Aerospace Center (DLR),9 could be classified as:
•	Intentional threats: Risks related to possibilities of 
an attack include disruption (‘jamming’), manipula-
tion (‘hacking’), corruption (‘spoofing’) or destruction 
of satellites by anti-satellite weapons. The use of mi-
crowave and radio frequency weapons as well as 
‘killer satellites’ are assigned to the same category.
•	Natural threats: These include risks arising from the 
space environment itself, for example collision with a 
solid object with cosmic origin (meteor), high-ener-
gy particle radiation, magnetic storms (solar storms), 
or strong temperature fluctuations.
Space systems provided support for navigation, weather, 
missile defence, communications, reconnaissance and 
surveillance, as well as target acquisition. As we face in-
creasing global responsibilities with smaller forces, our 
ability to accomplish military missions will depend even 
more on such force-enhancing support from space.8 
The dependency of NATO Forces on space systems re-
veals a major vulnerability due to a variety of threats.
Threats to the Critical  
Infrastructure Space
Understanding and defining existing and future 
threats that can damage or even destroy critical space 
infrastructure is a requirement for the development of 
needed and appropriate means of protection. The 
ground segments of space assets (control centres, 
ground stations, and space launch facilities) are mainly 
vulnerable to security risks such as cyber and physical 
attacks, whereas safety is the major concern with re-
Figure 2: Small space debris objects hitting and destroying a satellite.
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Protection Measures Against  
Space Debris
An intact space infrastructure depends on technolo-
gies still in need of investigation and development. 
One of the main tasks of German Aerospace Center de-
fence research is to provide an independent analysis 
and evaluation capability for the Federal Ministry of De-
fence (MoD). In that capacity, the DLR has conducted a 
comprehensive evaluation comparing the probability 
and impact of threats against potential space asset pro-
tection measures that could be realized with reasona-
ble cost and effort.10 The results showed very low effi-
ciency in shielding assets from the exponentially 
increasing space debris population, because measures 
could only be realized in the long-term and with high 
monetary investments in research and development 
programs. However, promising concepts for space de-
bris removal are currently being investigated by the 
DLR in order face the further evolving challenge.
Thus far, several protection measures and collision risk 
mitigation concepts have been proposed, though the 
technology might not yet be completely available. 
•	Artificial threats: Threats posed by space debris in-
clude decommissioned satellites, rocket stages and 
their parts, or other artificial space objects. Addition-
ally, design or development errors are allocated to 
the category of artificial threats.
In particular, the continuing growth of space debris 
poses an increasing threat to operational satellites. 
Today, the total amount of debris exceeds 200 million 
objects with diameters above 1 mm, accounting for a 
total mass of 6,500 tons. Of that, 77 per cent is con-
centrated in low Earth orbit (LEO), with higher con-
centration at 900 and 1,400 km. Studies show that 
the amount of debris in LEO is growing exponentially 
despite future debris release mitigation measures be-
ing considered. In the short and medium-terms, colli-
sions will likely become a much larger contributor to 
debris generation in LEO, which may cause an expo-
nential growth of further catastrophic collisions. 
Since even small objects can cause a total loss of the 
space system, space debris is already a major threat 
to satellite systems (Figure 2). With an estimated 
growth rate of about 5 per cent per year, the collision 
probability increases steadily.
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Laser-Based Debris Removal
A promising approach based on optical methods 
and laser technology will tackle this challenge. Opti-
cal tracking of space debris has already been dem-
onstrated with unprecedented accuracy.11 In a fur-
ther development, Laser Debris Removal (LDR) by 
ground-based lasers is intended to clean the Low 
Earth Orbits (LEO) from hazardous small and medi-
um size debris.
The LDR concept uses a beam of closely directed laser 
energy projected from the ground to modify the tra-
jectory of debris objects in low earth orbits (Figure 3). 
When the pulsed laser beam hits the object, it ablates 
and vaporizes a thin layer of material, and then it cre-
ates plasma and an exhaust plume, which leaves the 
debris surface at such high velocities it generates 
enough force to push the object into a new orbit or to 
cause debris to re-enter the atmosphere (Figure 4).
The different approaches depend strongly on the size 
and the dynamic regime of the debris.
•	Small size debris (less than 1 cm). Robust satellite ar-
chitectures or armor are recommended in order to 
shield against debris impacts. These protection 
measures have to be incorporated before launch 
and are the cheapest by comparison with others.
•	Large size debris (size more than 10 cm in size). Since 
this debris is usually tracked by ground stations and 
listed in orbital data catalogues, collision avoidance 
maneuvers are state of the art. More innovative is the 
idea of in-orbit protection vehicles to de-orbit debris 
surrounding space assets.
•	Medium size debris (between 1 cm and 10 cm). This 
class of debris presents the greatest threat to opera-
tional satellites. It is too big to be countered by 
shielding technologies and still too small to be mon-
itored and catalogued for collision avoidance with 
currently available technologies.
Figure 3: Ground-based laser beam modifying debris trajectory.
©
 D
LR
79JAPCC  |  Journal Edition 22  |  2016  |  Out of the Box
©
 D
LR
the necessity to have international authority to ensure 
safe operations. One can envision the realization such 
an innovative ground-based laser station to deal with 
medium size debris within the next decade.
Of great importance for the detailed layout of a LDR 
concept is the efficiency of the laser-matter-interac-
tion process, since it has a direct impact on the re-
quired laser power and hence the overall system 
specifications. The ratio of the thrust exerted to the 
debris object to the average laser power, which is 
commonly known as the impulse coupling coefficient 
cm, is a material-specific figure of merit. However, in 
general, the laser-induced thrust is not proportional 
to the average laser power in a simple way. In fact, cm 
depends mainly on the laser pulse fluence Φ at the 
The overall requirements for a future LDR system have 
been investigated by a European consortium within 
the CLEANSPACE project funded by the European 
Commission.12 The study comprises the concept of an 
innovative, ground-based laser station network, 
which allows for the protection of space assets from 
orbit collisions with medium-size debris. Research 
and technology developments in lasers, system di-
mensioning, trajectory simulation, and ‘policy, ethical, 
and societal’ implication activities have been taken 
into account, as well as state of the art situational 
awareness and space debris population surveillance. 
Within the framework of the CLEANSPACE project, the 
concept of a ground-based laser system has been 
validated and a preliminary architecture has been 
proposed, including crucial points like laser safety and 
Figure 4: Perigee lowering by laser induced momentum transfer.
80 JAPCC  |  Journal Edition 22  |  2016  |  Out of the Box
minium substrate), solar cell material and gold have 
been analysed by means of experiments with a tor-
sional thrust balance and hydrodynamic simulations 
based on a two-temperature-model. Depending on 
the irradiated material, the experiments found the 
threshold fluence spans a range from 2 J / cm² to 
8 J / cm² whereas optimum fluences are mainly locat-
ed beyond 7 J / cm² yielding impulse coupling coeffi-
cients of up to 30 N / MW (Figure 5).
The modelling and simulation of laser-matter interac-
tion is a difficult task, since there exists a variety of nu-
merical approaches. The validity of those approaches 
depends on the included parameters and particularly 
on the investigated timescale given by the laser pulse 
length and the corresponding temporal and spatial 
debris target exhibiting a threshold fluence Φth for the 
onset of ablation and an optimum fluence Φopt where 
cm shows a maximum.
The Institute of Technical Physics of the German Aero-
space Center has been dealing with the characteris-
tics and prospects of laser ablation propulsion for 
many years. The special challenges concerning laser-
matter interaction with respect to a LDR concept have 
been addressed by experimental as well a modelling 
and simulation activities.
At first, the work concentrated on the dependency of 
the impulse coupling on the laser fluence for space-
debris relevant materials. Aluminium, polyimide (both 
as a bulk material and a thin film material on an alu-
Figure 5: Experimental data on momentum coupling for space debris relevant materials.
©
 D
LR
81JAPCC  |  Journal Edition 22  |  2016  |  Out of the Box
Figure 6: 3-D model of plier (space debris).
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Figure 7: Impulse transfer and orientation impact.
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of the military on these systems will not only remain 
but will rise and is irreversible at the same time. Con-
sequently, the protection of space assets against 
threats and attacks is an essential task for the future. A 
variety of threats need to be considered. Although a 
single concept will never result in ‘zero’ risk, it can 
 reduce the risk of losing capabilities enabled by space. 
Laser-based debris removal represents an innovative 
concept to reduce the risk of collisions with space 
 debris objects. The required technology is currently 
being investigated by DLR scientists and engineers 
with the potential to integrate these in future opera-
tional systems. 
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regime of the ablation process. Nevertheless, the final 
model calculations are in good agreement with the 
experimental data and allow for the analysis of laser-
debris-interaction in an extended parameter field.
Further, the effects caused by complex shapes and 
varying orientation of a debris object on the thrust 
vector have to be taken into account. A software tool, 
EXPEDIT (Examination Program for irregularly shaped 
Debris Targets), was developed to calculate the im-
pulse transferred by laser ablation, taking into account 
variation of the fluence, self-shadowing and complex 
geometries. This tool allows for dynamic parameter 
studies to characterize the thrust vector and the in-
volved uncertainties for a complete LDR procedure.
A case study undertaken in order to investigate the 
behaviour of a single debris object was done using a 
3-D model of a set of pliers (Figure 6). The exact shape 
of the pliers is not as important as the general infor-
mation, which can be gleaned from the results. The 
calculation assumed a Gaussian laser beam profile 
and a pulse repetition rate of 200 Hz. Figure 7 shows 
the impulse transfer and the evolution of the orienta-
tion as shown by the three angles of rotation. As ex-
pected the impulse in z-direction is consistently larger 
than the impulses in the other directions.
Conclusions
Space must clearly be considered as a critical infra-
structure. Space-based assets have become indispen-
sable for our economy and security. The dependency 
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